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Over the course of  some years I have written and lectured on Paul
Ricoeur’s thought, and I have also run graduate seminars and participated
in other conferences and symposia dedicated to his work. And yet for
all of  that involvement, I would not consider myself  a “Ricoeur scholar”
in any technical sense of  the term. Others at this conference, and
especially Professor Charles Reagan, may rightly claim that title. I have
sought to think with, sometimes against, and also, when possible, beyond
Ricoeur’s works with respect to questions that emerge at the intersection
of  hermeneutics, theology, and ethics. As a thinker and as a man, Ricoeur
inspired many, many people. I draw on that inspiration today around
the topic of  how to formulate a viable kind of  “humanism” for our
time. Let me begin by introducing my topic and how I intend to address it.1
The Question At Hand
In this paper I want to think “after Ricoeur,” and in two senses.
I am trying, first, to address a question that is now emerging with its
full force after Ricoeur’s own life even if  he foresaw its importance,
namely, how to consider human existence in all its wild cultural and
religious diversity but also its deep commonality in order to foster respect
and betterment among peoples. Usually, this question is formulated in
terms of  universalism versus relativism, but I am addressing it with
respect to conceptions of  being human.2 Conflicts among peoples are
ripping the world apart; it is time to address this challenge in every way
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possible. Our situation thus poses anew and in a forceful way what
Immanuel Kant—who was so dear to Ricoeur—thought was the fourth
philosophical question. Recall that Kant insisted on three basic questions
which, in fact, structure much of  his critical philosophy and also
Ricoeur’s own thought: what can I know?, what ought I to do?, and
what can I hope for? But there is a fourth question, Kant knew: what
is man? Given the distinctiveness of  peoples but also the continuities
between human and non-human life, this fourth question forces itself
upon reflective people with renewed vigor. It demands a new kind of
humanism, I contend.
Second, I intend to explore this question of  humanism by
trying to think along with, to engage in a kind of  “nach-denken” as the
Germans might put it, and so to follow after Ricoeur’s own pathway
of  thinking. This means a couple of  things. As I will note in more
detail shortly, throughout his career Ricoeur sought to articulate a specific
kind of humanism, what he called the reality of the “third man” whose
existence emerges in the productive interaction and struggle between
Hellenistic and biblical sources within Western Civilization. This is a
form of  existence beyond those forces, and, so, perhaps a kind of
nomadic way of  life. I think we need third way thinking today too, but
on a global scale. I will develop this from Christian sources, but I hope
and believe that others will do something analogous from within their
own traditions. And, second, Ricoeur always insisted that we are human,
only human. The crucial dangers to human existence are, on the one
hand, to conceive of  our selves as somehow becoming more than
human, to celebrate a kind of  radical, heroic overcoming of  our
humanity, or, on the other hand, to fail to grasp the transcendent reach
of  human existence. I agree profoundly with Ricoeur on these matters,
and, in fact, will try to advance the argument a bit further. What that
entails for a renewed conception of  humanism, what I will call
“theological humanism,” should become obvious in the course of  my
reflection.
With some sense of  the task ahead, let me now turn to the
first step in my inquiry and outline how Ricoeur’s thoughts about the
human effort to be, to exist, commits him to a form of  humanism.
That will be followed by a comparison of  his thought with other
positions he explicitly addressed on this topic, namely, Friedrich
Nietzsche and Emmanuel Levinas. At the far end of  the inquiry I will
then be able to conclude with some reflections on theological humanism
and its meaning for thinking “after Ricoeur.”
RICOEUR AND THE RETURN OF HUMANISM
23
The Dispute About Humanism
Humanism is often associated with the return to the classics
by Renaissance thinkers as well as the celebration of  human creativity.
And there are, as we all know, various kinds of  humanism, ranging
from secular humanism to Christian and Jewish and other kinds of
religious humanism. My task here is not to sort through all of  those
differences or even to engage the history of  humanism. For present
purposes it is enough to isolate some convictions that are widely shared
among contemporary humanists despite whatever disagreements they
may have. About shared convictions, Tzvetan Todorov has recently
noted that humanists believe that “Freedom exists and that it is precious,
but at the same time they appreciate the benefit of  shared values, life
with others, and a self  that is held responsible for its action. . .”3 Todorov
formulates this outlook in terms of  what he calls the autonomy of  the
I, the finality of  the you, and the universality of  the they. Put otherwise,
the freedom of  the self, the moral claim of  others, and an inclusive
moral community are basic humanistic values. Humanists also insist
on human fallibility, and so humility in our appreciation of  truth. Finally,
humanists believe, in the words of  the critic Edward Said, that “human
history as made by human action and understood accordingly is the
very ground of  the humanities.”4 Most simply, for a humanist the
purpose of  thought and action is human flourishing, achieved by means
of  the distinctive human power to act and so to create history, whatever
other non-human purposes and goods might obtain. These ideals reach
a cultural apex in the West during the 18 and 19th centuries even if  they
sparked criticism and rejection as well.
Given these beliefs, it is not surprising that we are now amid a
widespread debate about the viability of  humanism. In an age of  global
dynamics there is the possibility for expanded cosmopolitan or world-
wide commitments, say to human rights, which challenge the tribalism
of  local loyalties and powers. Yet many people worry that humanistic
ideals are themselves just the imposition of  Western beliefs on other
peoples and cultures. Further, the various forms of  technology that
characterize the global age are driven by anthropocentric values that
endanger not only the natural environment but also myriad forms of
non-human life. For many people, humanism cannot be reconciled
with ecological sensibilities or concern for “animal rights.”5 Additionally,
as Ricoeur foresaw, there are new threats to the dignity and worth of
the individual person. Individuals are being subsumed into the working
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of  massive, complex political, economic, and technological systems.
Yet those systems, it would seem, can hardly be understood, let alone
analyzed, if  one clings to the traditional humanistic conviction that
human beings and human beings alone “make” history. If  we are to
have a realistic grasp of  the forces shaping the world, surely we must
attend to the matrices of  social power and the dynamics of  complex
systems freed from the humanistic bias for human agents.6 All of  these
developments characterize the “postmodern” or global age. They put
pressure on humanistic thinkers to defend their ethical commitments
as well to demonstrate the explanatory power of  conceptions of  history
and society bound to human capacities for action.
The humanistic cast of  Ricoeur’s own thought has long been
evident. It reaches from his earliest writings for the journal Esprit,
influenced by the personalism of  its founder Emmanuel Mounier, to
his last lectures and texts. In contrast to those who reject humanism,
Ricoeur held, like Todorov, Said and other contemporary neo-humanists,
that all works of  culture and society give expression, at least indirectly,
to human freedom. The dignity and freedom of  the human self, or the
autonomy of  the “I,” is one of  the dearest ideas to humanists. It is a
conviction that Ricoeur tenaciously defended. In fact, he developed
his position through sustained attention to human capability and also
fallibility. As Ricoeur noted very late in his career, “I look at my work as
an attempt to provide a survey of  the capabilities, so to say, of  the very
I can. . . . It can be read in terms of  four verbs which the “I can”
modifies: I can speak, I can do things, I can tell a story, and I can be imputed, an
action can be imputed to me as its author.”7 The capacity for speech,
action, historical understanding, and responsibility is predicated in
complex ways of  the “I” even as this “I” is only understandable in
terms of  these capabilities and their expressions. The effort to be, the
I can, is basic, then, to representations in speech, action, narration, and
the imputation of  responsibility. Further, in his Gifford lectures, Oneself
as Another, Ricoeur’s trajectory of  thought comes to its highest expression
when he explores the various forms of  capability with respect to “aiming
at the good life with and for others in just institutions.” That maxim
from the “little ethics” of  that text summarizes, in terms like Todorov’s,
the neo-humanistic contours of  Ricoeur’s thought.8 At the core of  his
far ranging corpus of  work is, then, the belief  that human beings are
incomplete creatures striving for some kind of  wholeness in our lives
by means of  cultural products and practices that endow life with
meaning.
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Attention to human capability and fallibility, and thus the
priority of  action to consciousness, required a significant shift in
thinking. “Should we not say,” Ricoeur wrote in one essay, “to exist is
to act? Does not being, in the first instance, signify an act?” “Being,” he
continued, “is act before it is essence, because it is effort before it is
representation or idea.”9 The domain of  representation and idea, the
whole realm of  meanings, thereby reveals and also conceals the human
effort to be. Anyone who wants to understand human existence must
interpret forms of  representation in order to clarify the meaning of
that struggle. Ricoeur himself  engaged in a grand and intricate
interpretation of  things human in order to catch a glimpse of  humanity
in via, including the problem of  evil that haunts the human adventure.10
Yet what does one mean by “the effort to be,” its aim, and also the
moral demand on our relations with each other?
Asking about the “effort to be” is a rather abstract way of
putting a question that is actually woven into the texture of  every human
life. The raw struggle for life, the pitch of  human wants and desires for
fulfillment against the onslaught of  age, death, and suffering, and
likewise the pangs of  love to embrace once more the beloved who has
been lost testify to a Wille zur Leben, a will to life, an attestation of
being, in human existence. To be or not to be is the question, Hamlet
thought; the desire to be, the sense that it is good to be, is a primitive
datum of  human existence linked to the struggle to live. The decision
to end life, the act of  suicide, is then always an intentional act that must
overcome the more primitive desire to live. Albert Camus thought that
“[t]here is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide.
Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the
fundamental questions of  philosophy.”11 Yet that way of  getting at the
problem is in the order of  critical judgment and philosophical reflection.
More directly, more immediately, life makes a claim on us. While
pessimism has been a seduction for some Western thinkers and always
stalks the human psyche, most people most of  the time love rather
than hate life.
On the plane of actual existence arguably the basic question
is whether it is good to be or not to be. This poses ethical and moral
questions. Is the mere preservation of  one’s own life or the life of
those dear to one the good to seek? What claim, if  any, do others make
upon my capacities, my power to act in the world? Which others matter?
Is the aim of human capability just the increase of strength, the
celebration of  power and independence marked, say in some Greek
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thinkers, by ideas of  honor and glory and happiness (eudaimonia) rooted
in the natural vitalities of  existence? Is the norm for human action a
command to care for the poor, the widow, and the stranger, a
commandment of  the God of  the Bible, or is that command uttered
simply and solely in the face of  another suffering human being? How
do these moral norms, whatever their content or origin, relate to the
tenacity of  the will to live? Must one extinguish the will to life in order
to pay reverence to other forms of  life?12
These are hardly abstract matters even if  they can be
formulated in abstract terms. The question of  the relation between the
effort to be, the will to life, and its proper norm or measure or aim
presses on daily existence in so far as to be human is to live with others
in shared institutions. Further, this question is at the center of  current
debates about humanism and Ricoeur’s own response to competing
philosophical positions. Put as a formula, Ricoeur’s type of  humanism
arises from an attestation to being a self  and yet also insists that we are
“human, only human.” Acknowledgment of  the limits on human
thought and action, limits rooted in our finitude and the reality of
others, are necessary to a proper grasp of  our existence. Only when
human beings repent of  all idolatry about their own power and
knowledge is the dignity of  human life manifest. In this respect, Ricoeur
contends that theological discourse and religious convictions use
concepts to denote limit experiences. They specify the finite condition
of human existence while also indirectly configuring an attestation to
being.
Later I want to press beyond Ricoeur’s position and outline
what I now call “theological humanism.” The formula here is “human,
truly human.”13 That is to say, I hope to bring to articulation a form of
humanism distinctive in its features but conversant with others positions
which, like Ricoeur, attend to the effort to be. That intention marks the
horizon of  this lecture and thereby will not be developed in great detail.14
On the way to that conclusion, it is necessary next to isolate the distinctive
traits of  Ricoeur’s humanism in contrast to rival accounts of  what it
means to be human that also focus on the “effort to be.”
On Ricoeur’s Humanism
Ricoeur developed his own position through “detours” of
interpretation and thereby engaging other thinkers. His ideas about
humanism can best be seen in contrast to the Nietzschean formulation
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of  “human, all-too human” and also Emmanuel Levinas’s humanism
of  the other, what I designate by the formula “human, otherwise than
human.”15 Nietzsche, recall, sought to announce the coming man, the
Übermensch, as a new form of  existence. The daybreak of  the Übermensch
is the finality of  human, all too human history. According to Levinas,
the face of  the other disrupts the drive to totality that is also the legacy
of  Western thought and life, especially under the dominance of  Greek
philosophy. The question of  the limit and value of  human power is
thereby variously construed in these formulae. For Nietzsche, the will-
to-power finds its limit only in the coming Übermensch and so after the
time of  “man.” With Levinas, the power of  the self  is decisively limited
by the advent of  the other, the command “Thou shall not Murder”
uttered by the face of  the other as if  from Mt. Sinai.
According to Ricoeur, the limit to and value of  human power
is rooted in the attestation of  oneself  as another and the acknowledgement
that we are human, only human.16 Against Nietzsche’s paradigmatically
“Greek” affirmation of  human power where the vitalities of  Will are
to be ever increased, and Levinas’s insistence on the finality of  the
other rooted in his sensibilities about Jewish law, Ricoeur explores the
reality of  the “third man,” as he once called it. Neither dominated by
forms of  Greek thought, to which the Christian message was
proclaimed, nor the circle of  Hebraic life, from which the Gospel arose,
this “’third man,’” Ricoeur notes, “this cultivated Christian, this believing
Greek, is ourselves.”17 This is not to say that Greek or Hebraic forms
of  humanism are impossible or invalid. Quite the contrary is the case.
That is a reason to engage Nietzsche and Levinas. The point, rather, is
that a Christian humanism, born from the tumultuous and yet exciting
encounter of  Greek and biblical modes of  life, signifies a distinctive
way of  being in the world. It is the reality of  the “third man” as a
human possibility. Let me follow Ricoeur on this trajectory of  thought.
Ricoeur asserted his own humanistic outlook in an early essay,
“What does Humanism Mean?” In that essay, Ricoeur wrote:
Man is man when he knows that he is only man. The
ancients called man a “mortal.” This “remembrance of
death” indicated in the very name of  man introduces the
reference to a limit at the very heart of  the affirmation of
man himself. When faced with the pretense of  absolute
knowledge, humanism is therefore the indication of  an
“only:” we are only men. No longer “human, all too
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human:” this formula still shares in the intoxication of
absolute knowledge; but “only human.”18
Careful attention to this passage enables us to isolate the contours of
Ricoeur’s humanism in contrast to the Nietzschean formula “human,
all too human” and Levinas’s humanism of  the other and its summary
formula “human, otherwise than human.”
In Ricoeur’s early essays, and also much later in Oneself  as
Another, he explicitly sets his thought against Nietzsche. In the Gifford
lectures Ricoeur identifies Nietzsche with the diminution of  the self.
Interestingly, in the early essay noted above the Nietzschean formula
of  “human, all too human” is associated with an excessive confidence
in absolute knowledge. Against that excess, Ricoeur insisted on the
limits to human knowledge, while in Oneself  as Another he opposes
Nietzsche’s seeming reduction of  the self  to non-human causal forces.
How can we explain the contradictory judgments about Nietzsche’s
thought and what is their significance for reading Ricoeur?
Ricoeur’s point, on my understanding, is that humanism is
inseparable from a perception of  human beings as mortal, as death-
bound. It is important to remember, as Tony Davies notes, the semantic
density of  the word “humanity.” “The root-word is, quite literally,
humble (humilis), from the Latin humus, earth or ground; hence homo,
earth-being, and humanus, earthly, human.”19 To be earth bound is, on
Ricoeur’s accounting, to be death-bound. There is a limit at the heart
of  the human project. Nietzsche’s announcement of  the coming of
the Übermensch after a history dominated by the nihilism of  human, all
too human values aspires to a level of  knowledge not possible for
mortals. In other words, for Ricoeur humanism necessarily expresses
itself  in a philosophy of  limits and the Nietzschean project strives to
exceed that mortal limit. “Man” cannot be overcome or transcended.
We are human, only human, Ricoeur insists. We have to forego any
pretense to know or to achieve a form of  existence beyond “man.”
This initial response to the Nietzschean agenda only partially
captures Ricoeur’s thought as seen from the beginning to the end of
his corpus. He always argued that at the heart of  the human being is
not simply the limit of  mortality, but, much more, an attestation, a
fundamental desire to be. Mortality is a limit but it is one within the
affirmation of  man himself. As we have already seen, the desire to be,
attestation to the goodness of  being, and not the Wille zur Macht, is
what defines the human being.20 The limit on that affirmation of  self
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arising from within one’s self  is mortality, the awareness of  death. While
enduring the fact of  mortality, there is nevertheless an attestation to
the goodness of  being “at the very heart of  the affirmation of  man
himself.” This affirmation opens another horizon to human time other
than the fate of  death. Through the power of  the imagination, the
desire to be reaches beyond mortality towards eternity in affirming its
existence while also enacting its own limit. Nietzsche’s attempt to reduce
the human to the “will to power,” no less than his hope in the coming
Übermensch, must be brought to criticism. If  the formula “human, all
too human” betrays an aspiration to absolute knowledge of  the coming
“man” not possible for finite creatures, the reduction of  human
existence to the “will to power” fails to grasp the desire to be in its
depth or scope. In the end, Nietzsche suffers inconsistency, exuding
epistemic confidence bound to ontological reductionism.21 And that
fact is, apparently, the reason for Ricoeur’s seemingly contradictory
judgments about Nietzsche’s agenda.
What then is the “limit” on the human effort to be? How, if  at
all, is it related to the moral norms? Around this question revolved the
encounter between Levinas and Ricoeur over many years. Levinas’s
claim, most boldly stated, is that the face of the other is the absolute
limit on the drive to totality, that is, the drive of  the self  to subsume all
being into the self.22 The other utters a command as if  from the height
of  Mt. Sinai, the mountain of  God: “Thou Shall Not Murder.” For
Levinas, the self  is a servant, a hostage, of  the other, and so infinitely
responsible for the life of  the other. The limit on the self, the assertion
of the ethical intentionality of humanism, is the face of the other and
not in the heart of  self-affirmation. “I am,” we might say for Levinas,
because the other commands me to be responsible.
In this respect, the death of  the other, and not my own death,
discloses the unique singularity of human existence and designates the
limit on human power. As Ricoeur notes about Levinas in Oneself  as
Another, “the face of  the other raises itself  before me, above me, it is
not an appearance that I can include within the sphere of  my
representations. To be sure, the other appears, his face makes him appear,
but the face is not a spectacle; it is a voice. The voice tells us, ‘Thou
shall not kill.’ Each face is a Sinai that prohibits murder.”23 Responsibility
is an affirmation of  the life of  the other otherwise than the drive to
totality arising from within the effort of  the self. This is a humanism
of  the other.
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It is at this juncture that Ricoeur sought to think through
consistently the attestation to being. Again, there is a “limit at the very
heart of  the affirmation of  man himself.” What I find within myself  is
that through all the mediations of  the desire to be, through labor, culture,
and speech, I am also and always as another. There is an “otherness” at
the core of  the human self  which, reciprocally construed, enables co-
jointly an affirmation of  self  and other. Ricoeur specified this otherness
in a number of  ways: the fact of  embodied freedom; the relation of
bios and logos in symbols; the dual horizon of  human time and eternity
configured in narratives; the mutual co-inherence in subjectivity between
ipse and idem identity; and, the moral injunction to love others as oneself.
The explanation of  the details of  those arguments spanning Ricoeur’s
corpus are beyond the scope of  these reflections.24
How then does Ricoeur’s argument differ from Levinas’s
position? The argument, if  I understand him rightly, is that we are
“only men,” and that means, in distinction to Levinas, that human
beings never escape, and in fact, will never escape, the tenacity of  the
effort to exist. An encounter between beings who are “only men” always
risks the reduction of  other to self  or the servitude of  self  to other.
The asymmetrical relation of  actor and patient in human relations is
the condition in which violence all too easily breaks forth. But the
proper aim is a good life by means of  responsibility for and with others
within just institutions. In order rightly to appreciate Ricoeur’s point
here, one needs to see a subtle shift in his consideration of  “the
affirmation of  man himself,” a shift I bracketed when considering
Ricoeur’s response to the Nietzschean project.
Levinas sought to isolate the origin of self-consciousness either
in the totalizing drive of  the ego or in the encounter with the face of
the other. Ricoeur did not try to establish the otherness of  the other in
terms of  the origin of  self-consciousness and thus the birthplace of  the
“I” and its representations. Having forsaken the search for a pristine
origin of  consciousness, he specified the trajectory or aim of  responsible
selfhood. If  the defining fact of  human being is not the cogito (the
thinking “I” as the origin of  representations), but, more simply, act
and the desire to be, then human beings in affirming themselves at one
and the same time affirm the being of  others, even while there is the
possibility of  fault and violence rooted in the power to act. The
responsible life is the enactment of  mutual respect amid the aim of
existence with and for others. This is why Ricoeur followed Kant and
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insisted on reciprocal regard in formulating the moral law: treat humanity
in oneself  or another always as an end and not merely as a means to
some other end. The categorical imperative is the deontological screen
through which the search for the good life must necessarily move in
light of  the ever present possibility of  violence. Any end that I seek,
any conception of  the good life, can only count as such if  it meets the
test of  justice. To recall Todorov’s phrase, Ricoeur insists on the finality
of  the “you,” the moral claim of  others.25 Yet this moral demand does
not escape, indeed cannot escape, the “human, only human” character
of  the effort to be and also the lurking threat of  violence.
It is important that the moral demand that limits any pursuit
of  the good life is found, according to Ricoeur, “at the very heart of
the affirmation of  man himself.” Contrary to Levinas, the limit that
constrains the wanton use of  power in seeking the self ’s good is not
heteronomous to the self, it is not from the demand of  the other, but,
rather, arises within self-affirmation, the attestation to the desire to be
found in myself  and all others. In a way decidedly different than Kant,
on whom Ricoeur relies so heavily, the law-giving power of  practical
reason is not the heart of  autonomy, of  freedom. Mindful of  the danger
of  violence, Ricoeur reformulates the meaning of  freedom. “Ethical
freedom,” he writes, “is not a claim which proceeds from me and is
opposed to any control; it is, rather, a demand which is addressed to
me and which proceeds from the other: allow me to exist in front of
you, as your equal.”26 In a word, the limit is annunciated by the other to
me, as Levinas rightly saw, but with respect to equal dignity, as Kant
insisted. The moral demand is the prism though which any aim in life
must pass if  it is to be justified. The source of  human dignity and its
aim is neither the other as other (Levinas) nor the law-giving power of
reason (Kant) but in the desire to be, the attestation to being, in self
and other.
Stated most succinctly, Ricoeur’s humanism articulates the
norm for human power not as the increase of  strength in order to
overcome an all-too-human existence and thereby incarnate the
Übermensch. The limit on power is not to be found in the ultimate
perfection of  power. The measure of  the effort to be is likewise not a
law announced in the face of  the other that places the self  on trial and
instigates infinite responsibility for the other. From Ricoeur’s perspective,
these forms of  thought share an unsustainable premise, namely, that
by the increase of  power or within the encounter with the other, the
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human as mortal and yet self-affirming will be transcended. According
to Ricoeur, we are “only men”; our form of  life cannot and will not be
overcome either in the future or in the face of  the other.
The full complexity of  the desire to be and its limit must then
be grasped if  we are to understand Ricoeur’s brand of  humanism and
also isolate the point of  departure for thinking beyond him. The desire
to be bears within itself  an irresolvable tension and perplexity, an aporia.
To desire being is at once to affirm being but from within the lack of
being; to desire is to affirm, to seek, within lack, and so marked with
finitude. The limit on this desire arises from within mortality. It is why,
as seen above, Ricoeur heralds “the remembrance of  death.” Yet if
that claim alone was adequate for his brand of  humanism, then privation,
nothingness, sheer finitude would define the most basic contours of
thought, and, further, being towards death, my own or that of  the
other, would be the necessary and sufficient conditions of  valid thinking.
Death is indeed necessary for valid reflection on human existence, but
it is not sufficient. In facing death, as a finite end, there is also an
attestation, an affirmation of  life.
How might this aporia be represented so that through
interpretation we can understand the full texture of  the human project?
In Ricoeur’s judgment, death, as one temporal horizon of  human
existence, has its meaning in relation to the human capacity to imagine
“eternity” as a horizon of  meaning which exceeds finite limits.27 Eternity,
likewise, has its meaning, for human beings, in its other: the orientation
towards death that is the limit in the heart of  self-affirmation. The fact
that I can tell a story represents, configures, within the order of  discourse
both the limit (death) and the affirmation (eternity) that is at the heart
of  self-affirmation. Narratives render productive the aporia of  human
existence in time.28 The dual temporal structure of  human being
rendered productive in the capacity to narrate an account of  one’s life
is, one must admit, an intuition, a grasp of  (or being grasped by) a self-
evident value.
Ricoeur insists that human existence is always open both to
the ever-present possibility of  death and yet in imagination, and so in
hope, to a horizon of  meaning that exceeds finitude and death. Cultural
forms, works of  art, and religious symbols provide configurations of
human temporal existence through which one can grasp via careful
interpretation the outlines of  basic structures and dynamics of  being
human. And those same works open a vision of  reality in which human
beings can find their ownmost possibilities for life. Incomplete creatures
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we are, but we are also beings who create meanings in order to discover
the truth of  our lives and thereby endow existence with significance.
Ricoeur’s humanism of  limits, we can say, articulates these aporia of
human being-in-the-world. The meaning of  existence is attained through
the interpretation of  the manifold representations of  the human effort
to be. This brings me to the last step in my reflections and so the
moving beyond Ricoeur’s formula, “human, only human.”
Toward Theological Humanism
The aporia of  the desire to be, Ricoeur seems to be saying,
imposes itself with the force of self-evidence and, when considered
consistently, leads to a humanism of  limits, the insight that “we are only
men.” This is where, as they say, the spade is turned. Ricoeur’s account
of  the “third man” and with it the insight that we are human, only
human, claims for itself  the same level of  plausibility and equal force
of  self-evidence as the Wille zur Macht for Nietzscheans and the face of
the other on Levinas’s account. At this juncture in our reflections, a
question naturally arises. Are these types of  humanism exhaustive? Is
there any other account that can make some claim to the force of  self-
evidence about the limit and value of  the effort to be? The types, as we
have seen, claim with Nietzsche, on one extreme, that the limit on
human power is with respect to its destiny of  self-overcoming, the
emergence of  a new form of  human life after our human, all too human
existence. The philosopher seeks that new form of  humanity. At the
other end of  the typology is Levinas’s contention, appealing to the
evidential power of  the face of  the other, that the limit on human
power does not and cannot arise within the self ’s effort to be and
thereby is, in this respect, human, otherwise than human. And, finally, Ricoeur
proposes a type of  humanism which, we might say, mediates these
extremes. It is a strictly philosophical account of  the reality of  the
“third man” made possible in Christian faith. He locates a limit to the
effort to be “at the very heart of  the affirmation of  man himself ” and
in the realization that we are human, only human specifies the norm of
human power in terms of  the demand to aim at the good life with and
for others in just institutions. Are these the only options available to a
humanist who seeks to unfold with the force of  self-evidence the depth
and limit on the effort to be? More pointedly, if  one lifts the brackets
Ricoeur places on theological thinking within his philosophy, is there
another possibility for considering the reality of  the “third man”? What
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might that form of  thinking contribute to the current debate about the
task of humanism?
Another option is in fact possible; I designate it as “theological
humanism.” This too is a vision of  life for the “third man,” but it
departs from Ricoeur, and so too Levinas and Nietzsche, insofar as the
limit on human power is not my own morality, the death of  the other,
or the end of  human, all too human history. The limit on human power,
the measure of  our effort to be, is the love of  life, the depth of  which
is the love of  the living God. The possibility of  this measure, and so
another form of  humanism, arises from greater attention to an idea
which I noted previously in these reflections and yet quickly suspended
in order to engage Ricoeur’s argument. The idea, recall, was that the
hatred of  life, articulated in a systematic pessimism or the challenge of
wanton suicide, is not coequal, it does not bear the same evidential
weight, as a primitive love of  life. What if  one attends to this love and
its self-evident force in human existence?
To be sure, Ricoeur seemed to have grasped this point and
that is why he insisted on the “affirmation of  man himself.” Yet, as we
have seen, because he specifies this “affirmation” within the “effort to
be,” rather than with reference to the love of  life, the limit of  human
power must be found in the other of  attestation to power, namely, in
death as the end of  power and thus the end of  the capacity for violence.
The aporia that the affirmation of  life bears its limit in mortality means
that we are human, only human. Ricoeur’s humanism, we might say,
demarcates philosophically the space in which human existence can
unfold within its own finite limits. He insists on this point, as we have
seen, because the celebration of  self-overcoming is finally beyond our
capacities even as the command of  the face of  the other can never
quell our self-affirmation. The question remains, however. Is mortality
the “other” to the love of  life that forms the limit to human power?
It is at this juncture that the narrative and symbolic resources
of  the biblical traditions enunciate another possibility on the plane of
representations, which, I wager, can be redeemed philosophically in
terms of  their self-evidential power. Death may indeed form a limit to
my power, so too the command not to kill the other or even the
emergence of  a new form of  humanity. Yet none of  those limits, rooted
in mortality, limits the love of  life by what exceeds human existence.
They specify humanism just in terms of  another human. The
transcendence that marks the limit to human power is circumscribed
by intra-human relations, what is sometimes called “lateral
RICOEUR AND THE RETURN OF HUMANISM
35
transcendence” where God is conceived as a fiction (Nietzsche), a trace
(Levinas) or within the mirror of  scripture (Ricoeur). That is why,
obviously, these are various kinds of  humanism. Yet does it not also
confront me with the force of  self-evidence that the love of  life is just
that, a love of  life that both exceeds and yet embraces human beings,
including the human will to live?29 How then to articulate this intuition?
What representations can be used to articulate this love of  life and its
meaning for the limits on human power? Will this require a new type
of humanism?
The biblical religions present in symbolic and narrative form
the insight that the love of  life finds its limit in the longing for the
divine and thus intensifies human transcendence. In the love of  God is
disclosed a limit to the idolatry of  any finite love, any elevation of  self,
other, or specific attachment to divine status. In the love of  God, in
other words, is represented the insight, the intuition, that we are human,
truly human, only when our love for life embraces finite existence, our
own and others, within a love of  what exceeds the finite and yet endows
mortal existence with distinctive dignity. As Ricoeur rightly saw, the
love of  life is the animating impulse of  the effort to be. Yet when this
love is embraced by a love of  divine life, then, the biblical texts suggest,
we are human, truly human. In fact, we might say, using Christian
categories, that the “fall” into sin is precisely the regress from the truly
human to being only human, to live limited by death rather than by the
love of  God. And in fact within the myth of  the “fall,” the account in
Genesis, the connection is drawn between death and turning from
God. In the fall, human beings are subjugated to the law of  sin and
death.
It is not surprising, then, that the biblical texts formulate the
law of  life, the proper limit on human power, in terms of  the complex
relation and ordering between the command to love God with one’s
whole heart, strength, and mind and one’s neighbor as oneself.30 The
great double love command specifies as a maxim of  actions the limit
of  love on human capacity. The self-evident force of  this maxim is
found not in our mortality and violence (Ricoeur) or power (Nietzsche)
or the vulnerability of  the other (Levinas). It is found in that the love
of  finite life is also and always a longing for divine life. St. Augustine
and many others rightly captured this insight by noting that in all loves
what is co-loved is the divine, the living God. That insight must then
be formulated not only as a type of  humanism but also a kind of  piety,
WILLIAM SCHWEIKER
36
a religious longing. One can specify it as theological humanism whose
basic formula is human, truly human.
That is not enough, however. Insofar as theological humanism
is developed from Christian sources and with reference to the “third
man” more needs to be said. One ought not to efface the “humanism”
and the celebration of  human vitalities through attention to the love
of  God.31 In this light, the claim of  the Christian message is that the
“God” who is loved in all acts of  the love for life is the power of  all life.
Yet this divine life has been manifested in human time in the Christ, a
power made perfect in the loving service of  others. That insight enables
the Christian imagination to intensify the law of  freedom initially
inscribed in biblical discourse in terms of  the double love command.
As St. Paul puts it at Galatians 5:13, “For you were called to freedom,
brothers and sisters; only do not use your freedom as an opportunity
for self-indulgence, but through love become slaves one to another.
For the whole law is summed up in a single commandment, “You shall
love your neighbor as yourself.” Once life is seen “in Christ,” then the
double love command is intensified in the direction of  love for the
human other as the limit on human and even divine power. The contrast
is no longer intra-human versus extra-human transcendence; there is
an ingression of  the love of  God into the mutual love of  neighbors.
This requires that Christian theological humanism articulate itself
through predicates borrowed from christological formulae: like Christ
one is called to be human, truly human in the freedom of  love. Yet this
formula, I suggest, is not without the force of  self-evidence; it is not
merely a dogmatic assertion. The love of  life, our own self-affirmation,
the reciprocal claim of  self  and other, and a longing for the divine
become articulate in the idea, the representation, of  a Gospel of  love.
This is why the Gospel is the possibility of  the “third man” who is
neither slave nor free, Greek nor Jew, male nor female existing in a
freedom other than the vitalities of  nature or the giving of  the law
(Gal. 3:28).32
It is not clear that Ricoeur would reject my formulation of
theological humanism for the “third man.” However, it is obvious that
he did not articulate his position in this way, owing, I suppose, to the
division he drew between philosophical and theological reflection. My
point is to note that within the reality of  the “third man,” that form of
life marked as the believing Gentile, a type of  humanism is possible
wherein the limit on the effort to be is not simply the sting of  mortality
and the threat of  violence to the other but much more the longing for
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the divine. Once this longing, itself  an attestation and a struggle, finds
representation in the biblical witness, the limit on human power is the
transformation of  freedom in service and love to the other as oneself.
Here is enacted, in a way contrary to Nietzsche, the overcoming, the
perfection, of  human existence.33 This limit, manifest in the Christ, is
also the claim of the Christian conscience whose force of self-evidence
is no less pointed than the law given at Sinai.
In closing, it might be asked of  me why this revision in the
humanistic agenda is needed for Christians, for the “third man,” in our
time. In my judgment, the development of  theological humanism
around the formula human, truly human, is required in order to accomplish
a task that Ricoeur saw in the dawning of  the global age and yet did not
fully address. “The time in which we live,” he wrote, “is one of  planetary
consciousness.” And in this situation “[w]hat the theologian should
rediscover here is that true Christian universalism which is a universalism
of  “intention” completely distinct from the universal “pretension” of
the Christianity of  the Constantinian Age.”34 Only when the humanism
of  the “third man” is formulated in order to respect and enhance the
integrity of  life rooted in the love of  life and disciplined by the free
service of  others can it hope to speak to the needs and longings of  an
age riddled with endangerments to human and non-human life. One
trusts that thinkers in other religious traditions will work out their own
analogous kind of  humanism. By isolating a new formula for humanism,
I have thereby sought in this paper to think “after Ricoeur” by continuing
further along that path he so brilliantly and faithfully sought to travel.
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